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ABSTRACT
Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) can only be deployed if
they can effectively complete their missions and respond to
failures and uncertain environmental conditions while main-
taining safety with respect to other aircraft as well as hu-
mans and property on the ground. In this paper, we design
a real-time, on-board system health management (SHM) ca-
pability to continuously monitor sensors, software, and hard-
ware components for detection and diagnosis of failures and
violations of safety or performance rules during the ﬂight
of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, provid-
ing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and/or software sig-
nals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on-
the-ﬂy temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis;
(3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power real-
ization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) that
avoids overburdening limited computing resources or cost-
ly re-certiﬁcation of ﬂight software due to instrumentation.
Johann Schumann et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, pro-
vided the original author and source are credited.
Our implementation provides a novel approach of combin-
ing modular building blocks, integrating responsive runtime
monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with
model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based proba-
bilistic analysis. We demonstrate this approach using actual
data from the NASA Swift UAS, an experimental all-electric
aircraft.
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern unmanned aerial systems (UASs) are highly com-
plex pieces of machinery combining mechanical and electri-
cal subsystems with complex software systems and controls,
such as the autopilot. Rigorous requirements for safety, both
in the air and on the ground, must be met so as to avoid endan-
gering other aircraft, people, or property. Even after thor-
ough pre-ﬂight certiﬁcation, mission-time diagnostics and
prognostics capabilities are required to react to unforesee-
able events during operation. In case of problems and faults
in components, sensors, or the ﬂight software, the on-board
diagnosis capability must be able to detect and diagnose the
failure(s) and respond in a timely manner, possibly by trigger-
ing mitigation actions. These actions can range from a simple
1
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mode change to following a pre-programmed ﬂight path (in
case of minor problems, such as a lost communications link)
to a controlled emergency landing in a remote and safe area
(in case of more severe problems).
Most current UAS systems, however, only have very rudi-
mentary fault detection systems. There is a need for advanced
health management systems that, in case of anomalies, can
quickly and reliably pinpoint failures, carry out accurate diag-
nosis of unexpected scenarios, and, based upon the deter-
mined root causes, make informed decisions that maximize
capabilities to meet mission objectives while maintaining
safety requirements and avoiding safety hazards.
In this paper, we describe a novel framework for the design
and realization of a powerful, real-time, on-board sensor and
software health management system that can (a) dynamically
monitor a multitude of sensor and software signals; (b) per-
form substantial reasoning for fault diagnosis; and (c) avoid
interfering in any way with the ﬂight software or hardware or
impeding on scarce on-board computing resources.
To this end, we have developed a three-pronged approach that
combines the capabilities of temporal logic runtime moni-
tors, model-based analysis, and powerful probabilistic rea-
soning using Bayesian networks (BNs) (Pearl, 1988; Dar-
wiche, 2009). Models are designed using a number of dif-
ferent building blocks for advanced temporal monitoring,
model-based ﬁltering, signal processing, prognostics, and
Bayesian reasoning. Figure 1 shows a high-level represen-
tation of such a model. In this example, raw sensor or soft-
ware signals are ﬁrst fed into a smoothing block to weed out
sensor noise. Then, one signal is fed into a temporal moni-
tor, which produces a value indicating whether the temporal
formula is valid, not valid, or unknown at this point in time.
The other signal is fed as a measurement into a Kalman ﬁlter.
The outputs of both blocks are fed into a Bayesian network
block, which performs statistical reasoning and produces pos-
terior probabilities of a fault mode (see also Mengshoel et al.,
2008; Ricks & Mengshoel, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Mengshoel
et al., 2010).
The simple example in Figure 1 shows how an SHM capabil-
ity can be constructed in a scalable, modular, and hierarchi-
cal manner and highlights the potential beneﬁt of our three-
pronged approach. It separates temporal properties, model-
speciﬁc properties, and the (time and memory-free) proba-
bilistic reasoning into separate components that are easy to
model and efﬁcient to execute. Our framework encourages
this separation of concerns.
In this paper, we discuss in detail the three major building
blocks and describe a novel method to implement such a
health management system on a Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) for highly efﬁcient processing and minimal
intrusiveness. We detail how to instrument NASA’s Swift
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Figure 1. An example instantiation of an SHM model,
illustrating one possible interconnection between signal pro-
cessing, temporal monitoring, model-based processing, and
Bayesian reasoning blocks.
UAS with this new SHM capability.
Monitoring Sensors and Software. On-board sensor read-
ings are used by on-board software during ﬂight; any ﬂight-
time sensor failures should be detected and diagnosed. How-
ever, there can be dangerous interactions between the sensors
and the software. Perfectly working sensors can trigger soft-
ware faults, when, for example, operating in an unexpected
environment. Alternatively, a faulty sensor can cause unex-
pected software behavior, e.g., originating from a dormant
software bug. Finally, sensor and software failures can trigger
issues in entirely different subsystems. For example, a soft-
ware failure in the navigation system can cause the communi-
cation system to fail, as happened when F-22 Raptors crossed
the international date-line on their deployment to Kadena in
2007 (Johnson, 2007).1
Although pre-deployment veriﬁcation and validation (V&V)
can be very effective in minimizing bugs in on-board soft-
ware, it is impossible to eliminate all software bugs due to the
size and complexity of the software as well as unanticipated,
and therefore unmodelled, environmental conditions. The
need to catch fault scenarios not detected by pre-deployment
V&V is even more pressing when considering software in
unmanned systems, since these systems often do not have to
undergo the same highly rigorous and costly V&V processes
required for manned systems (e.g., according to DO-178C
(RTCA, 2012) for commercial transports).
It is therefore mandatory for both sensor and software moni-
toring to be performed during ﬂight, for failure and faults to
be detected and diagnosed reliably, and for root-cause anal-
ysis to be performed in real time. Only then can appropriate
mitigation strategies be activated to recover the UAS or return
it to the ground in the safest possible manner.
Temporal and Model-based Data Processing. The collec-
tion of all readings of sensors and software state comprises
a high-dimensional and fast (around 20Hz or more) real-time
data stream that needs to be processed by our health man-
agement system. On a high level, our approach to coordi-
nated, multilevel system-wide sensor and software monitor-
1See Section 8.3 for a more detailed discussion.
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ing transforms this fast, high-dimensional data stream into
an informed basis for making intelligent decisions. We dis-
cuss a new method for runtime monitoring of temporal logic
system safety requirements, in order to enable better prob-
abilistic reasoning compared to what was previously possi-
ble. Model-based data processing components include, for
example, Kalman ﬁlters, Fast Fourier Transforms, or a model-
based prognostics component. We can thus reason about sen-
sors, software, and the outputs of prognostics components
(e.g., end of useful component life) in a single framework.
Bayesian Reasoning. Our framework uses a Bayesian net-
work to perform diagnostic reasoning and root cause analysis.
Although dynamic BNs (DBNs) have, in theory, the capabil-
ity to directly process high-dimensional time-series data, such
an approach may not be realistic in many applications due to
scalability limitations and high computational requirements.
We therefore separate the processing of temporal and model-
based aspects of the data from the actual statistical reasoning
part.
In order to address practical considerations including sensor-
software interdependencies, the demands of real-time tempo-
ral and model-based data processing, and Bayesian reason-
ing for decision making, we present a novel modeling frame-
work for sensor and software health monitoring. The frame-
work separates model-based analysis, temporal monitoring,
and statistical reasoning, thus making SHM more efﬁcient,
easier to model, and more robust. To enable its application
in real-time systems, e.g., on-board of unmanned aerial sys-
tems, we will demonstrate how this framework, using tem-
poral logic monitors, model-based preprocessing units, and
static Bayesian networks, facilitates modular model design
and can be executed highly efﬁciently on FPGA hardware.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After dis-
cussing related approaches in Section 2, we introduce our
problem domain in Section 3, including the architecture of
NASA’s Swift UAS and the requirements that must be met
for its safe operation. In Section 4, we discuss major design
requirements for our approach and present an overview of the
building blocks comprising our SHM framework. In the fol-
lowing sections, we give further details of the major com-
ponents of this framework, namely monitors using temporal
logic in Section 5, model-based monitors in Section 6, and
Bayesian reasoning components in Section 7. We then pro-
vide further details on our implementation of all these com-
ponents, and discuss experimental results for ﬂight test data
from the Swift UAS in Section 8. Section 9 discusses future
work and concludes.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1. System Health Management
Vehicle health management performs similar tasks to Fault
Detection, Diagnosis, and Recovery (FDDR). There exist
many FDDR approaches and (commercial) tools that are
being actively used in the aerospace industry. For exam-
ple, TEAMS2 is a model-based tool used for diagnosis and
test planning. It enables hierarchical, multi-signal diagno-
sis, but does not model temporal or probabilistic relation-
ships. The underlying paradigm of FACT3 is fault propa-
gation with temporal constraints. More complex diagnosis
systems like HyDE4 execute simpliﬁed dynamical models on
various abstraction levels and compare model results against
signal values for fault detection and diagnosis. Livingston5 is
a NASA open-source diagnosis and recovery engine that uses
a set of high-level qualitative models; the behaviors are spec-
iﬁed in temporal logic. Formal V&V for such models have
been carried out using the SMV model checker (Lindsey &
Pecheur, 2004).
Bayesian networks are also useful for fault detection, diagno-
sis, and decision making because of their ability to perform
deep reasoning using probabilistic models. Likelihood of
failures, for example, expressed as mean-time between fail-
ure (MTBF), can be cleanly integrated. Whereas there are
a number of tools for Bayesian reasoning (e.g., SamIam6 or
Hugin Expert7), they have not been used extensively for sys-
tem health management, in part because of computationally
intensive reasoning algorithms.
Fortunately, this situation has started to change. A testbed
for electrical power systems in aerospace vehicles, the NASA
ADAPT testbed (Poll et al., 2007), has been used to bench-
mark several system health management techniques. One
of them is ProADAPT, a system health management algo-
rithm using Bayesian networks (Ricks & Mengshoel, 2009a,
2009b, 2010). ProADAPT uses compilation of Bayesian net-
works into arithmetic circuits (Darwiche, 2003; J. Huang,
Chavira, & Darwiche, 2006; Chavira & Darwiche, 2007) for
efﬁcient sub-millisecond computation. In addition, ProAD-
APT demonstrates how to diagnose a comprehensive set of
faults, including faults of a continuous and dynamic nature,
by means of discrete and static Bayesian networks. This work
also shows how Bayesian system health models can be gener-
ated automatically from electrical power system wiring dia-
grams (Mengshoel et al., 2008, 2010).
2http://www.teamqsi.com/products/teams-designer/
3http://w3.isis.vanderbilt.edu/Projects/Fact/Fact.htm
4http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/tech/dash/diagnostics-and-prognostics/hyde
-diagnostics/
5http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/opensource/projects/livingstone2/
6http://reasoning.cs.ucla.edu/samiam/
7http://www.hugin.com/
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2.2. Runtime Veriﬁcation
Existing methods for Runtime Veriﬁcation (RV) (Barringer
et al., 2010) assess system status by automatically generat-
ing (mainly software-based) observers to check the state of
the system against a formal speciﬁcation. Observations in
RV are usually made accessible via software instrumentation
(Havelund, 2008); they report only when a speciﬁcation has
passed or failed, e.g., through adding hooks in the code base
to detect changes in the state of the system being monitored.
Such instrumentation may make re-certiﬁcation of the sys-
tem onerous, alter the original timing behavior, or increase
resource consumption (Pike, Niller, & Wegmann, 2011); we
seek to avoid this problem. Also, reporting only the outcomes
of speciﬁcations does not provide the real-time responsive-
ness we require for our SHM framework.
Systems in our applications domain often need to adhere
to timing-related ﬂight rules like: after receiving the com-
mand “takeoff” reach an altitude of 600 ft within ﬁve min-
utes. These ﬂight rules can be easily expressed in tempo-
ral logics; often in some ﬂavor of Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) (Bauer, Leucker, & Schallhart, 2010). To reduce run-
time overhead, restrictions of LTL to its past-time fragment
have been used for RV applications previously, mainly due to
promising complexity results (Basin, Klaedtke, & Za˘linescu,
2011; Divakaran, D’Souza, &Mohan, 2010). Though speciﬁ-
cations including past time operators may be natural for some
other domains (Lichtenstein, Pnueli, & Zuck, 1985), ﬂight
rules like those we must monitor for the Swift UAS require
future-time reasoning. To enable more intuitive speciﬁca-
tions, others have studied monitoring of future-time claims;
see (Maler, Nickovic, & Pnueli, 2008) for a survey and
(Geilen, 2003; Thati & Ros¸u, 2005; Divakaran et al., 2010;
Maler, Nickovic, & Pnueli, 2005, 2007; Basin, Klaedtke,
Mu¨ller, & Pﬁtzmann, 2008) for algorithms and frameworks.
Most of these RV algorithms, however, were designed with a
software implementation in mind and require powerful com-
puters that would far exceed the weight, size, power, band-
width, and other limits of the Swift UAS.
2.3. Hardware Architectures
The above approaches to system health management are typi-
cally implemented in software executing on traditional CPUs.
However, with the recent developments in parallel comput-
ing hardware, including in many-core graphics processing
units (GPUs), Bayesian inference can be performed more efﬁ-
ciently (Kozlov & Singh, 1994; Namasivayam & Prasanna,
2006; Xia & Prasanna, 2007; Silberstein, Schuster, Geiger,
Patney, & Owens, 2008; Kask, Dechter, & Gelfand, 2010;
Linderman et al., 2010; Jeon, Xia, & Prasanna, 2010; Low et
al., 2010; Bekkerman, Bilenko, & Langford, 2011; Zheng,
Mengshoel, & Chong, 2011; Zheng & Mengshoel, 2013).
Several of the recent many-core algorithms are based on the
junction tree data structure, which can be compiled from a BN
(Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; Dawid, 1992; C. Huang &
Darwiche, 1994; Jensen, Lauritzen, & Olesen, 1990). Junc-
tion trees can be used for both marginal and most probable
explanation (MPE) inference in BNs. A data parallel imple-
mentation for junction tree inference was developed already
in the mid-1990s (Kozlov & Singh, 1994), and the basic sum-
product computation has been implemented in a parallel fash-
ion on GPUs (Silberstein et al., 2008). Based on the cluster-
sepset mapping method (C. Huang & Darwiche, 1994), node-
level parallel computing techniques have recently been devel-
oped for GPUs (Zheng et al., 2011; Zheng & Mengshoel,
2013), resulting in as much as a 20-fold speed-up in process-
ing compared to sequential techniques.
Other authors have used the beneﬁts of a hardware archi-
tecture to natively answer statistical queries on BNs. For
example, Lin, Lebedev, and Wawrzynek (2010) discuss a
BN computing machine with a focus on high throughput.
Their architecture contains two switching crossbars to inter-
connect process units with memory. Their implementation,
however, targets a resource intensive grid of FPGAs, making
this approach unsuitable for our purposes. Kulesza and Tyl-
man (2006) present another approach to evaluate Bayesian
networks on reconﬁgurable hardware. Their approach targets
embedded systems as execution platforms and is based on
evaluating Bayesian networks through elimination trees. The
major drawback of their approach is that the hardware struc-
ture is tightly coupled with the elimination tree and requires
that the hardware be re-synthesized with every change in the
BN.
3. SYSTEM BACKGROUND
Due to the increasing interest in using unmanned aircraft for
different military, civilian, and scientiﬁc applications, NASA
has been engaged in UAS research since its inception. The
Swift aircraft was designed to support NASA’s research inter-
ests in aeronautics and earth science—particularly in auton-
omy, intelligent ﬂight control, and green aviation. For safe
operation, the UAS must meet a large number of require-
ments that in large part come from NASA and FAA processes
and standards. In the following, we will brieﬂy describe the
characteristics of the Swift UAS and discuss types of safety
requirements and ﬂight rules.
3.1. The NASA Swift UAS
For full scale ﬂight testing of new UAS concepts, the
NASA Ames Research Center has developed the Swift
UAS (Ippolito, Espinosa, & Weston, 2010), a 13 meter
wingspan all-electric experimental platform based upon a
high-performance sailplane (Figure 2). Swift has a full-
featured ﬂight computer and control for sensor payloads. The
individual components are connected via a common bus inter-
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face and running a C/C++ reﬂection architecture, which pro-
vides a component-based plug-and-play infrastructure. Typi-
cal sensors include barometric altitude sensor, airspeed indi-
cator, GPS, and a laser altimeter to measure the altitude above
ground.
Figure 2. The Swift all-electric UAS.
3.2. Requirements and Flight Rules
The system safety requirements we want to monitor during
operation of the Swift UAS can be categorized into these
three types: value checks, relationships, and ﬂight rules.
Value Checks test whether data values are plausible. Exam-
ples in this category include range checks, e.g., the maximal
safe climb or descent rate. For safe operation, the values
must always stay within certain ranges. Such checks can be
combined with additional conditions (e.g., during the ﬂight
phase or above a minimal altitude) or temporal ranges (e.g.,
the maximal current drawn from the battery must not exceed
50A for more than 60 seconds to avoid overheating).
Relationships encode dependencies among sensor data that
may originate from different subsystems. For example, alti-
tude readings obtained by GPS and barometric altitude should
be highly correlated. For another example, whenever the
Swift UAS is in the air, its indicated airspeed reading should
be greater than its stall speed; if not there is certainly a prob-
lem.
Finally, Flight Rules are deﬁned by national or international
institutions (e.g., part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR) in the USA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013))
or by mission/system constraints that govern ﬂights. For
example, a common ﬂight rule deﬁnes the minimum altitude
an aircraft needs to climb to after takeoff: reach an altitude
of 600ft within ﬁve minutes after takeoff. In a similar way,
we can specify a timeout for the landing procedure of the
Swift UAS: after receiving the landing command, touchdown
needs to take place within three minutes. We discuss in detail
how these requirements and ﬂight rules can be speciﬁed in
our framework and how they can be translated into efﬁcient
hardware.
4. SYSTEM HEALTH MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Our modeling framework for sensor and software health man-
agement separates signal processing and model-based analy-
sis, temporal monitoring, and statistical reasoning with BNs.
We ﬁrst discuss the overarching design requirements before
we focus on the description of the design framework. Each of
the framework’s three prongs will then be described in detail
in the subsequent sections.
4.1. Design Requirements
For autonomous systems running on ultra-portable hardware
such as the Swift UAS, the following properties are required
for a deployable SHM framework.
UNOBTRUSIVENESS The SHM framework must not alter
crucial properties of the Swift UAS, such as: function-
ality (not change its behavior), certiﬁability (avoid re-
certiﬁcation of, e.g., autopilot ﬂight software or certi-
ﬁed hardware), timing (not interfere with timing guaran-
tees), and tolerances (not exhaust size, weight, power, or
telemetry bandwidth constraints). The framework must
be able to run and perform analysis externally to the (pre-
viously developed and tested) Swift architecture.
RESPONSIVENESS The framework must continuously
and in real time monitor adherence to the safety require-
ments of the Swift UAS. Changes in the validity of mon-
itored requirements must be detected within tight and a
priori known time bounds. Responsive monitoring of
speciﬁcations enables responsive input to the BN-based
probabilistic reasoner. In turn, the BN reasoner must
efﬁciently support decision-making to mitigate any prob-
lems encountered (e.g., for the Swift UAS an emergency
landing in case the ﬂight computer fails) to avoid damage
to the UAS and its environment.
REALIZABILITY The framework must operate in a plug-
and-play manner by connecting via a read-only interface
to existing communication interfaces of the Swift UAS.
The framework must be usable by test-engineers with-
out assuming in-depth knowledge of hardware design
and must be able to operate on-board existing UAS com-
ponents without requiring signiﬁcant re-conﬁguration or
additional components. The framework must be recon-
ﬁgurable so that health models can be updated without
a lengthy re-compilation process and can be used both
during testing of the UAS and after deployment.
Considering these requirements, it seems natural to imple-
ment our SHM framework in hardware. This allows us to
build a self-contained unit, operating externally to the estab-
5
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lished Swift UAS architecture, thereby complying with the
UNOBTRUSIVENESS requirement. Multiple safety require-
ments can be monitored in parallel, with status updates
delivered at every tick of the system clock, establishing the
RESPONSIVENESS requirement. Previous implementations
of system monitors in hardware, however, have often violated
the REALIZABILITY requirement as a reconﬁguration, e.g.,
due to changes in the SHM model, necessitates a redesign of
the framework’s hardware.8 To provide greater ﬂexibility in
this regard, we design an efﬁcient, highly parallel hardware
architecture that runs on the Swift UAS’ native FPGA hard-
ware, yet keep it programmable and modular to quickly adapt
to changes in our SHM models.
4.2. Design Framework
Our SHM model is constructed hierarchically in a graphical
manner out of powerful building blocks. In contrast to most
existing systems, we do not separate between an (informal)
signal preprocessing step and the proper health management
model. Rather, we elevate all processing steps to ﬁrst class
status and model them all in the same framework. With that
approach, we can, in a principled way, deal with all tempo-
ral, probabilistic, and model-based aspects of our health man-
agement model. This uniform way of describing the health
model not only enables more powerful techniques for V&V
but it also directly leads to efﬁcient implementations in pro-
grammable FPGA hardware.
All signals considered in our SHM model are streams of data,
which are processed at ﬁxed time stamps. At each tick of the
system clock, a component reads the input values and calcu-
lates the output values. The order of execution is deﬁned by
a model graph. In this paper, we assume that there exists one
ﬁxed update rate for all of the building blocks of the model.9
Such a stream of individual elements of type T is denoted by
T ⋆; vectors are deﬁned naturally. Table 1 shows the different
data types that are used. Please note that Boolean data types
are implicitly converted into a {0,1} discrete representation.
All data blocks have a number of inputs Ij of a given stream
type, and will produce a number of outputs, again as elements
of a stream. Table 2 shows a list of selected blocks. Only
the current values of the signals are presented to the model.
Depending on its functionality, a block can be memory-less
(e.g., a Boolean function or a Bayesian reasoning block),
or it can contain internal memory (of ﬁxed length) to deal
with previous signal values. Blocks with internal memory
include the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) processing blocks
and blocks for data smoothing, integration, or model-based
8Or at least a run of a logic synthesis tool, which can easily take tens of
minutes to complete.
9If signals are to be considered with different rates, rate conversion blocks or
sample and hold blocks can be deﬁned and used as needed. Note also that
Bayesian networks handle missing data in a natural way and do not need
conversion, sample, or hold blocks.
Kalman ﬁlters (Table 2).
Table 1. Data types for SHM components.
Signal Data Type
Symbol Description
R ﬂoating point number, e.g., sensor reading
D discrete set {1, . . . , n}
B Boolean
B+ true, false, maybe
p probability
P probability density
Table 2. Typical SHM building blocks.
Name Function Memory Description
BF Bn → Bm Boolean function
LTLs Bn → B+
m synchronous LTL
observer
LTLa Bn → Bm ○ asynchronous LTL
observer
THR Rn →Dm discretizer/threshold
FLT Rn → Rn ○ smoothing ﬁlter
KF Rn → R2m+n ○ Kalman ﬁlter with
xˆ, residual and
diag(P −)
BN Dn → Rm discrete Bayes rea-
soner
BNp Rl → R2m Bayes reasoner with
evidence inputs and
posterior outputs
P Rl → R2 Prognostics unit
For example, a block to discretize sensor readings would take
a ﬂoating-point number and calculate its discretized value or
a Boolean value for a simple threshold. A smoothing ﬁlter,
calculating a moving average, would have the functionality
Rn → Rn and obviously require internal memory. A tempo-
ral monitoring component has Boolean inputs and produces a
2 or 3-valued logical output that indicates whether the mon-
itored requirement is true, false, or unknown given the
inputs. In Section 5 we will discuss such monitors in detail.
Our BN (see Section 7 for details) takes discrete values as
inputs, called evidence, and produces a posterior probabil-
ity. Model-based prognostics units, which take sensor signals
as inputs and output estimates of remaining useful life for
speciﬁc components, can substantially increase the modeling
power and reasoning capabilities of our SHM framework. For
example, a loss in propeller RPM might be diagnosed differ-
ently if it is known that the battery might already be fairly
weak.
Beyond the building blocks shown in Table 2, additional ﬁl-
ters, Fourier transforms, or model-based components can eas-
ily be added to improve the modeling capabilities of our SHM
6
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framework. For most of the components, efﬁcient designs for
programmable hardware are available; for our temporal mon-
itors and Bayesian reasoning building blocks, our hardware
implementations will be discussed in the sections below.
The main goal of our SHM framework is to provide a mod-
eling paradigm that allows the modeler to separate tempo-
ral, functional, model-based, and probabilistic reasoning in a
clear way while retaining the expressive power of the various
formalisms. This framework also avoids powerful but com-
plex modeling mechanisms, like dynamic Bayesian networks
(DBNs).
5. MONITORING OF TEMPORAL SENSOR DATA USING
TEMPORAL LOGIC
In order to encapsulate the safety requirements of the Swift
UAS in a precise and unambiguous form that can be analyzed
and monitored automatically, we write them in temporal
logic. Speciﬁcally, we use a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL),
which allows the expression of requirements over timelines
and also pairs naturally with the original English expression
of the requirements.10 For requirements that express spe-
ciﬁc time bounds, we use a variant of LTL that adds these
time bounds, called Metric Temporal Logic (MTL). We can
automatically generate runtime monitors for requirements
expressed in these logics, enabling real-time analysis of sen-
sor data as well as system health assessment.
Linear temporal formulas consist of:
1. Variables representing system state: We include vari-
ables representing the data streaming from each sensor
aboard the Swift UAS.
2. Propositional logic operators: These include the stan-
dard operators, logical AND (∧), logical OR (∨), negation
(¬), and implication (→).
3. Temporal operators: These operators express temporal
relationships between events including ALWAYS, EVEN-
TUALLY, NEXTTIME, UNTIL, and RELEASE where the
following hold for example system Boolean variables p
and q.
• ALWAYS p (◻p) means that p must be true at all
times along the timeline.
• EVENTUALLY p (◇p) means that p must be true at
some time, either now or in the future.
• NEXTTIME p (Xp) means that p must be true in the
next time step; in this paper a time step is a tick of
the system clock aboard the Swift UAS.
10In the temporal logic formulas of this paper, we follow the standard syn-
tax for evaluating temporal properties where = means assignment and ==
means equality comparison. For example, (a == b) returns true if a and b
are equal and false otherwise. At the same time, we follow the tradition in
probability, where = means equality and not assignment. It should be clear
from the context whether we are dealing with a temporal logic expression
or a probability expression.
• p UNTIL q (pU q) signiﬁes that either q is true now,
at the current time, or else p is true now and p will
remain true consistently until a future time when q
must be true. Note that q must be true sometime; p
cannot simply be true forever.
• p RELEASES q (pR q) signiﬁes that either both p
and q are true now or q is true now and remains
true unless there comes a time in the future when
p is also true. Note that in this case there is no
requirement that p will ever become true; q could
simply be true forever. The RELEASE operator is
often thought of as a “button push” operator: push-
ing button p triggers event ¬q.
For MTL, each of these temporal operators are accompa-
nied by upper and lower time bounds that express the time
period during which the operator must hold. Speciﬁcally,
MTL includes the operators ◻[i,j] p, ◇[i,j] p, p U[i,j] q, and
p R[i,j] q where the temporal operator applies in the time
between time i and time j, inclusive. Additionally, we use a
mission bounded variant of LTL where these time bounds are
implied to be the start and end of the mission of the UAS. In
all cases, time steps refer to ticks of the system clock. So, a
time bound of [3,8] would designate the time bound between
3 and 8 ticks of the system clock from now. Note that this
bound is relative to “now” so that continuously monitoring a
formula ◇[3,8] p would produce true at every time step t for
which p holds anytime between 3 and 8 time steps after t, and
false otherwise.
Figures 3 and 4 give pictorial representations of how these
logics (mission-bounded LTL and MTL) enable the precise
speciﬁcation of temporal safety requirements in terms of
timelines.
Examples of System Requirements in Temporal Logic.
Due to their intuitive nature and a wealth of tools and algo-
rithms for analysis of LTL and MTL formulas, these logics
are frequently used for expressing avionics system require-
ments (Zhao & Rozier, 2012; Gan, Dubrovin, & Heljanko,
2011; Bolton & Bass, 2013; Alur & Henzinger, 1990). Recall
the example system safety requirements from Section 3.2. We
can straightforwardly encode each of value checks, relation-
ship requirements, and ﬂight rules as temporal logic formulas
to enable runtime monitoring:11
Value Checks:
• The maximal safe climb and descent rate Vz of the Swift
UAS is limited by its design and engine characteristics.
◻(−200
ft
min
≤ Vz ≤ 150
ft
min
)
11The numbers given below are for illustration purpose only and do not
reﬂect the actual properties of the Swift UAS.
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Symbol Operator Timeline
Xp NEXTTIME p
◻p ALWAYS p p p ppp p p p
◇p EVENTUALLY p
pUq UNTIL p pp p q
pRq RELEASE p,qq qq q
Figure 3. Pictorial representation of LTL temporal operators. For a formal deﬁnition of LTL, see for example (Rozier, 2011).
Symbol Operator Timeline
◻[2,6]p ALWAYS[2,6] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p p p p p
◇[0,7]p EVENTUALLY[0,7] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p
pU[1,5]q UNTIL[1,5] 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p p q
pR[3,8]q RELEASE[3,8]
p,q
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
qqq
Figure 4. Pictorial representation of MTL temporal operators. For a formal deﬁnition of MTL, see for example (Alur & Hen-
zinger, 1990).
• The maximal angle of attack α is limited by design char-
acteristics.
◻(α ≤ 15○)
• The Swift roll (p), pitch (q), and yaw rates (r) are for safe
operation limited to remain below maximum bounds.
◻(p < 0.99
rad
s
∧ q < 4.0
rad
s
∧ r < 2.2
rad
s
)
• The battery voltage Ubatt and the current Ibatt must
remain within certain bounds during the entire ﬂight.
Furthermore, no more than 50A should be drawn from
the battery for more than 30 consecutive seconds in order
to avoid battery overheating.
◻( (20V ≤ Ubatt ≤ 26.5V ) ∧
(Ibatt ≤ 75A) ∧
((Ibatt > 50A)U[0,29s](Ibatt ≤ 50A)))
Relationships:
• Pitching up (i.e., increasing α) for a sustained period of
time (more than 20 seconds) should result in a positive
change in altitude, measured by a positive vertical speed
Vz . This increase in vertical speed should occur within
two seconds after pitch-up.
◻(◻[0,20s](α > α0) → ◇[0,2s]Vz > 0)
This relationship can be reﬁned to only hold if the engine
has enough power (as measured by the electrical current
to the engine Ieng) to cause the aircraft to actually climb.
◻(◻[0,20s]((α > α0) ∧ Ieng > 30A) → ◇[0,2s]Vz > 0)
Similarly, a rule for the descending can also be deﬁned.
◻(◻[0,20s]((α < α0) ∨ Ieng < 10A) → ◇[0,2s]Vz < 0)
• Whenever the Swift UAS is in the air, its indicated air-
speed (VIAS) must be greater than its stall speed VS . The
UAS is considered to be air-bound when its altitude alt
is larger than that of the runway alt0.
◻((alt > alt0) → (VIAS > VS))
• The sensor readings for the vertical velocity Vz and the
barometric altimeter altb are correlated, because Vz cor-
responds to the changes in the altitude. This means that
whenever the vertical speed is positive, we should mea-
sure a certain increase of altitudeΔaltb within 2 seconds.
◻(Vz > 0→◇[0,2s]Δaltb > θ)
• The precision of the position reading PGPS from the
8
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GPS subsystem depends on the number of visible GPS
satellites Nsat.
◻(
◻(Nsat == 1) → PGPS ≤ P 1GPS ∧
◻(Nsat == 2) → PGPS ≤ P 2GPS ∧
◻(Nsat == 3) → PGPS ≤ P 3GPS ∧
◻(Nsat ≥ 4) → PGPS ≤ P +GPS)
Flight Rules:
• After receiving a command (cmd) for takeoff, the Swift
UAS must reach an altitude of 600ft within 40 seconds.
◻((cmd == takeoff) → ◇[0,40s](alt ≥ 600 ft))
• After receiving the landing command, touchdown needs
to take place within 40 seconds, unless the link (lnk) is
lost. Otherwise, the aircraft should reach a loitering alti-
tude around 425ft within 20 seconds.
◻((cmd == landing) →
((slnk == ok) → ◇[0,40s](alt < 10 ft)∨
(slnk == lost) → ◇[0,20s](400ft ≤ alt ≤ 450ft)))
• The Swift default mode is to stay on the move; it should
not loiter in one place for more than a minute unless it
receives the loiter command (which may not ever hap-
pen during a mission). Let sector crossing represent a
Boolean variable, which is true if the UAS crosses the
boundary between the small subdivision of the airspace
in which the UAS is currently located, as determined by
the GPS, and another subdivision. After receiving the
loiter command, the UAS should stay in the same sec-
tor, at an altitude between 400 and 450ft until it receives
a landing command. The UAS has 30 seconds to reach
loitering position.
◻([(cmd == loiter)R(◇[0,60s] sector crossing)]∧
[(cmd == loiter) →
(◻[30s,end]((¬sector crossing)∧
(400ft ≤ alt ≤ 450ft))
U (cmd == landing))
])
• All messages sent from the guidance, navigation and
control (GN&C) component to the Swift actuators must
be logged into the on-board ﬁle system (FS). Logging
has to occur before the message is removed from the
queue. In contrast to the requirements stated above, this
ﬂight rule speciﬁcally concerns properties of the ﬂight
software.
◻((addToQueueGN&C ∧◇removeFromQueueSwift) →
¬removeFromQueueSwift U writeToFS)
Advantages of Temporal Logic Requirements. Encoding
the set of system requirements in temporal logic offers sev-
eral signiﬁcant advantages. It yields a very precise, unam-
biguous list of the system requirements that aids in project
planning and organization. It enables us to automatically
synthesize runtime monitors to track these requirements on-
board the Swift UAS directly from the temporal logic spec-
iﬁcations. It also enables other types of automatic checks,
such as automatic requirements debugging (i.e., satisﬁabil-
ity checking (Rozier & Vardi, 2010)) and design-time V&V
techniques such as model checking (Rozier, 2011).
5.1. Monitoring Approach
From each temporal logic requirement, we automatically gen-
erate two kinds of monitors, which we call synchronous and
asynchronous monitors, working in coordination to provide
real-time system health updates. A synchronous monitor pro-
vides an update on the requirement with every update of the
system clock. This is important because it provides blocks
such as the Bayesian reasoner with better real-time infor-
mation and therefore improves prognostics capabilities by
enabling monitoring input to be considered by the reasoner.
Our synchronous runtime monitors keep up-to-date informa-
tion on how much time is left until a requirement must pass.
An asynchronous monitor provides an update on the ﬁnal
outcome of the requirement at an a priori known time. Our
asynchronous monitors report if a requirement is satisﬁed or
fails earlier than expected or yield the ﬁnal result (pass or
fail) of the requirement when its time bound has elapsed.
For details on the construction of these monitors, and for-
mal proofs that our constructions are correct, see (Reinbacher,
Rozier, & Schumann, 2013).
This dual-monitor construction is a key element of our SHM
framework, because it enables our runtime monitors to be
used as building blocks in combination with the other blocks
described in this paper. Traditional runtime monitoring tech-
niques only operate asynchronously and only report when a
monitored property fails. Our monitors provide much more
useful output. For example, it can be important in comput-
ing prognostics to know that a requirement that must hap-
pen within a speciﬁed time bound has not yet been satisﬁed
and that the time bound is almost up. This allows mitigat-
ing actions to be considered in time. For another example,
if a requirement states that (EVENTUALLY[3,2005] p) and p
occurs at time 5 it is important to utilize this information for
real-time calculations of system health. Traditional monitor-
ing techniques do not yield any output in this case, either at
time 5 or 2005 since no property failure occurred. Finally,
it is key that our runtime monitors can provide this informa-
tion without any modiﬁcations to certiﬁed ﬂight software or
hardware, operating in isolation aboard an FPGA with a read-
only interface, whereas most runtime monitoring techniques
utilize more obtrusive techniques for gathering system data.
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6. MODEL-BASED MONITORING OF TEMPORAL SEN-
SOR DATA
Highly accurate and detailed information about system health
could be obtained if the actual system is compared with
a high-ﬁdelity simulation model. Model complexity and
resource limitations make such an approach infeasible in
most cases. However, a comparison of system behavior with
an abstracted dynamical model is an attractive option. HyDE,
for example, performs health management using simpliﬁed
and abstracted system models.
For our framework, we provide the capability to use model-
based monitoring components to various degrees of abstrac-
tion. The most common of such components is a Kalman
ﬁlter. Here, a linearized model of the (sub-)system dynamics
is used to predict the system state from past sensor readings.
Besides this state prediction, the residual of the Kalman ﬁl-
ter is of importance for our purposes, as it reﬂects how well
the model represents the actual behavior (Brown & Hwang,
1997). A sudden increase of the ﬁlter residual, for example,
can give an indication of a malfunctioning sensor. For imple-
mentation, we use our tool AUTOFILTER (Whittle & Schu-
mann, 2004) to automatically generate customized Kalman
ﬁlter algorithms from high-level requirements. As we reﬁne
our conﬁguration to handle more complex SHM capabili-
ties needed for future ﬂight tests of the Swift UAS, we are
planning to extend the AUTOFILTER tool in order to directly
produce corresponding FPGA designs (see, e.g., Pasricha
& Sharma, 2009). In a similar manner, non-linear models
could be handled using Particle Filters (Ristic, Arulampalam,
& Gordon, 2004), though these require more computational
efforts.
A very simple temporal monitoring technique is the use of
FFT in order to obtain an estimate of the frequency spec-
trum of the monitored signals. This information is, for exam-
ple, important to detect oscillations of the aircraft (see Sec-
tion 8.3), or to detect unexpected software behavior, like a
reboot loop.
Though our implementation at this time is limited to stan-
dard ﬁltering monitors, we envision creating more powerful
model-based monitors using prognostics models to produce
statistical distributions for the end-of-life of system compo-
nents based upon sensor readings. For example, a prognos-
tics model to estimate the remaining useful life of the laser
altimeter could be used to effectively encode a dynamical
MTBF into our health management system. Again, both the
mean remaining life as well as information about its probabil-
ity distribution can be directly used for reasoning. Although
such model-based health management components can be
very powerful, a number of issues still need to be addressed,
including model validity, implementation in efﬁcient hard-
ware, and possible model adaptation to better detect and han-
dle certain kinds of failures.
7. BAYESIAN HEALTH MANAGEMENT REASONING
The major reasoning component in our SHM framework is a
Bayesian network (BN) used to perform diagnostic reasoning
and root causes analysis. A BN is a multivariate probability
distribution that enables reasoning and learning under uncer-
tainty (Pearl, 1988; Darwiche, 2009). In a BN, random vari-
ables are represented as nodes in a Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG), while conditional dependencies and independencies
between variables are induced by graph edges (see Figure 5
for an example). A BN’s graphical structure often represents
a domain’s causal structure, and is typically a compact repre-
sentation of a joint probability table. Each node in the BN’s
graphical structure is associated with a corresponding condi-
tional probability table (CPT) that captures its (causal) rela-
tionship with parent nodes.
S
C
H_S
H_U
U
Figure 5. Simple Bayesian network.
In our framework, the BN inputs are comprised of discrete
or discretized values (e.g., low, high), and reasoning is per-
formed at each tick of the system clock. We are using dis-
crete and static BNs, which do not perform any reasoning
in the temporal domain. All temporal reasoning, as well as
other processing, has been cleanly separated out within our
modeling framework. Although, in general, multiple differ-
ent probabilistic queries can be formulated, our framework
aims to compute marginal posterior probabilities of selected
nodes, which then give an indication (probability) of compo-
nent or system health. Thus our Bayesian reasoning compo-
nents compute a posteriori probabilities as their output. Dif-
ferent BN inference algorithms can be used to compute a pos-
teriori probabilities. These algorithms include junction tree
propagation (Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; Jensen et al.,
1990; Shenoy, 1989), conditioning (Darwiche, 2001), vari-
able elimination (Li & D’Ambrosio, 1994; Zhang & Poole,
1996), stochastic local search (Park & Darwiche, 2004;
Mengshoel, Roth, & Wilkins, 2011; Mengshoel, Wilkins, &
Roth, 2011), and arithmetic circuit evaluation (Darwiche,
2003; Chavira & Darwiche, 2007).
7.1. Bayesian Health Models
For the Bayesian models, we follow an approach that “glues
together” Bayesian network fragments (Schumann, Meng-
shoel, & Mbaya, 2011; Schumann et al., 2013). For exam-
ple, consider the Bayesian network in Figure 5. It consists of
four different types of interconnected nodes, namely: com-
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mand node C, health node H , sensor node S, and status node
U . The health node H has subtypes H S for sensor nodes
and H U for status nodes. Inputs to a BN is provided by
connecting an input signal to the state of a node (“clamp-
ing”). Command nodes C are handled as ground truth and
used to indicate commands, actions, or other known states.
Command nodes do not have incoming edges. Sensor nodes
S are also input nodes, but the input signal is not necessar-
ily correct (e.g., it could result from a failed sensor). This
behavior is modeled by connecting S to a health node H that
reﬂects the health of the input to S. Note that inputs to the BN
can be outputs of any block in our framework, for example,
a smoothed and discretized sensor reading, the result (binary
or ternary) of a temporal monitor, or the output of another
reasoning block.
Status nodes U , and similar behavior nodes B, are inter-
nal nodes and reﬂect the (latent) status of the subsystem or
component, or recognize a speciﬁc behavior, such as pilot-
induced oscillation. Typically, health nodesH are attached to
status nodes, but not to behavior nodes. Associated with each
node is a Conditional Probability Table (CPT), which deﬁnes
the conditional probability of node X , given the states of the
parent nodes of X .
For modeling the edges of the BN, we follow the rule that
an edge from node X to node Y indicates that the state of
X has a (causal) inﬂuence on the state of Y . Table 3 gives
an overview of the different kinds of edges in our modeling
framework.
Table 3. Types of edges typically used in BN models for the
SHM reasoning blocks.
edge E E represents how . . .
{H,C} E→ U status U , with health H , is controlled
through unreliable command C
{C} E→ U status U is controlled through unreliable
command C
{H,U} E→ S status U inﬂuences sensor S, which may
fail as reﬂected in health H
{H} E→ S health H directly inﬂuences sensor S
without modeling of status
{U} E→ S status U inﬂuences sensor S
7.2. Compilation to Arithmetic Circuits
We select arithmetic circuit evaluation as the inference algo-
rithm used in our framework, and therefore compile our
Bayesian network into an arithmetic circuit. In real-time
avionics systems, where there is a strong need to align
the resource consumption of diagnostic computation with
resource bounds (Musliner et al., 1995; Mengshoel, 2007),
algorithms based upon arithmetic circuit evaluation are pow-
erful, as they provide predictable real-time performance
(Chavira & Darwiche, 2005; Mengshoel et al., 2010).
An arithmetic circuit (AC) is a DAG in which leaf nodes λ
represent parameters and indicators while other nodes repre-
sent addition and multiplication operators.
Posterior marginals in a Bayesian network can be computed
from the joint distribution over all variables Xi ∈ X :
p(X1,X2, . . .) = ∏
λx
λx∏
θx∣u
θx∣u
where θx∣u are the parameters of the Bayesian network, i.e.,
the conditional probabilities that a variable X is in state x
given that its parents U are in the joint state u, i.e., p(X =
x ∣ U = u). Further, λx indicate whether or not state x is
consistent with the observations. For efﬁcient calculation, we
rewrite the joint distribution into the corresponding network
polynomial f (Darwiche, 2003):
f = ∑
x
∏
λx
λx∏
θx∣u
θx∣u
An arithmetic circuit is a compact representation of a net-
work polynomial (Darwiche, 2009) which, in its uncompact
form, is exponential in size and thus unrealistic in the gen-
eral case. Hence, answers to probabilistic queries, includ-
ing marginals and MPEs, are computed using algorithms that
operate directly on the arithmetic circuit. The marginal prob-
ability (see Corollary 1 in (Darwiche, 2003)) for x given evi-
dence e is calculated as
Pr(x ∣ e) =
1
Pr(e)
⋅
∂f
∂λx
(e) (1)
where Pr(e) is the probability of the evidence. In a bottom-up
pass over the circuit, the probability of a particular evidence
setting (or clamping of λ parameters) is evaluated. A sub-
sequent top-down pass over the circuit computes the partial
derivatives ∂f
∂λx
. This mechanism can also be used to pro-
vide information about how change in a speciﬁc node affects
the whole network (sensitivity analysis), and to perform MPE
computation (Darwiche, 2003, 2009).
7.3. Efﬁcient Hardware Realization
Bayesian reasoning blocks in our framework are provided
with values produced by other blocks, as input to C and S
nodes. In our BN hardware implementation, these evidence
values are used to calculate posterior marginals for the health
nodes H of the Bayesian SHM model. For efﬁcient hard-
ware realization of this kind of BN reasoning, we note that
posterior marginals are evaluated in the arithmetic circuit by
traversing the nodes of the circuit in a bottom-up and a sub-
sequent top-down manner.
We make the following observations regarding the structure
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Figure 6. Screenshot of our GUI-based BN synthesis tool. There is a textual description of the altimeter health model Bayesian
network (top), a compiled arithmetic circuit of the network (bottom left), and a binary conﬁguration for our μBayes unit (bottom
right).
of arithmetic circuits:
(i) The structure alternates between addition and multiplica-
tion nodes. Nodes labeled with “+” are addition nodes;
those labeled with “×” are multiplication nodes.
(ii) Each multiplication node has a single parent.
(iii) Input nodes (i.e., leaf nodes) are always children of mul-
tiplication nodes.
Hardware Architecture of μBayes. The above observa-
tions, concerning the structure of arithmetic circuits, led us
to a hardware architecture that evolves around parallel units
called computing blocks. A computing block, as shown in
Figure 7, is designed to match the structural properties (i-iii)
of an arithmetic circuit. A single computing block supports
computing
block
mode a)
×/+
×/+ ×/+
i1 i2 i3 i4
mode b)
×/+
×/+
i1 i3 i4
mode c)
×/+
i1 i4
i1 i2 i3 i4
result
mode
Figure 7. A computing block and its three modes of opera-
tion.
three basic modes to process the different shapes found in
subtrees of arithmetic circuits. Re-arrangement of the arith-
metic circuit using commutativity properties of the operators
enables us to tile the entire AC with instances of these three
modes in Figure 7.
These computing blocks are the building blocks of our
12
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bus interface
control unit
memory interface / multiplexer
network
parameter (θ)
memory
evidence
indicator (λ)
memory
instruction
memory
scratchpad
memory
ALU
×/+
×/+ ×/+
i1 i2 i3 i4
Figure 8. Internals of a computing block.
Bayesian SHM hardware unit, which we call μBayes.
Figure 8 shows the internals of a computing block. The unit
is loaded with network parameters from the CPT of the health
model at conﬁguration time. At each SHM update cycle,
inputs are provided as evidence indicators and stored in a sep-
arate evidence indicator memory. An ofﬂine compiler trans-
lates the structure of the arithmetic circuit into native instruc-
tions for the μBayes unit. Instructions encode the oper-
ation (either addition or multiplication) of each individual
node of the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU), control the mul-
tiplexer to load/store operands from/to memory, trigger trans-
fers of results, and coordinate loads of inputs. Instructions
are decoded and forwarded by the control unit. Each comput-
ing block manages a scratchpad memory to save intermediate
local results, computed during the bottom-up traversal, which
can be reused during the top-down traversal. The memory
blocks of the μBayes unit are mapped to block RAMs of the
FPGA.
Figure 9 shows the architecture of our Bayesian health man-
agement hardware unit. It interconnects and controls multiple
computing blocks to process arithmetic circuits in parallel.
The master unit manages bus accesses, stores intermediate
global results, and computes posterior marginals according
to Equation 1. The inverse of the probability of the evi-
dence, 1
Pr(e) , in this equation can be computed within the
master in parallel to the top-down traversal of the arithmetic
circuit once the bottom-up traversal is completed. Posterior
marginals can then be computed efﬁciently by multiplying
the partial derivatives ∂f
∂λx
obtained by the top-down traversal
with the cached value of 1
Pr(e) .
For our implementation, we designed the μBayes unit in
the hardware description language VHDL and use the logic-
synthesis tool ALTERA QUARTUS II12 to synthesize the
design onto an Altera Cyclone IV EP4CE115 FPGA. In our
implementation, we chose to represent fractional values in a
12Available at http://www.altera.com. We used v11.1 in our experiments.
ﬁxed-point representation. This decision avoids the consider-
able blow-up in hardware requirements that we would incur
if all of the computing blocks had to be equipped with a full-
ﬂedged ﬂoating-point unit. Instead, we instantiate ﬁxed-point
multipliers, available on our target FPGA, to realize the arith-
metic operations within the computing blocks. Modern-day
FPGAs provide several hundred of such multiplier units.
Synthesizing an Arithmetic Circuit into a μBayes Pro-
gram. A (GUI-based) application (see Figure 6) on a host
computer compiles an arithmetic circuit into a tuple ⟨Π, C⟩,
where Π is a native program for the μBayes unit and C is a
conﬁguration for the network parameter memory. The syn-
thesis of ⟨Π, C⟩ from an arithmetic circuit involves the fol-
lowing steps:
(1) Parse the circuit into a DAG and use compile-time infor-
mation from the Ace package13 to relate nodes in the
DAG to evidence indicators and network parameters.
Assemble network parameter values according to the
CPTs and add them to C. Perform equivalence transfor-
mations on the DAG to ensure that the available modes
of a computing block are able to cover all parts of the
arithmetic circuit.
(2) Apply a variant of the Bellman-Ford algorithm (Bellman,
1958) to the DAG to determine the distance of each node
to the root node. Based on the distances and the width of
the arithmetic circuit, determine the number of required
computing blocks. Rearrange computing blocks to opti-
mize the number of results that can be reloaded from the
same computing block in the next computation cycle.
(3) For each computing block c: generate an instruction π
for each node in the arithmetic circuit that is computed
by c. Finally, add π to Π.
To conﬁgure the μBayes unit, the tuple ⟨Π, C⟩ is transferred
at conﬁguration time, i.e., before deployment, to the master
unit, which then programs the individual computing blocks.
During operation, the entries for the evidence indicator mem-
ory are broadcast by the master unit at each tick of the system
clock when new input values are available.
Hardware Resource Consumption. We synthesized the
hardware design of the μBayes unit for various target FPGAs
using the industrial logic synthesis tool ALTERA QUARTUS
II. To study the hardware resource consumption of our design
we synthesized the design several times with varying num-
bers of computing blocks. For our implementation, we used
a ﬁxed-point number representation with 18 bits to internally
represent probabilities. We have chosen this representation
13http://reasoning.cs.ucla.edu/ace/
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Annual Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society 2013
computing
block 0
computing
block 1
computing
block . . .
computing
block n − 1
computing
block n
master
input bus
output bus
conﬁg
⟨Π, C⟩
Figure 9. Architecture of the μBayes unit with parallel computing blocks.
mainly because our target FPGA provides ﬁxed point multi-
pliers that support vectors of up to 18 bits.
For example, an instantiation of the μBayes unit with 7 paral-
lel computing blocks accounts for a total of 25,719 logic ele-
ments (22.5 % of the total logic elements) and 20,160 mem-
ory bits (2.5 kByte, 0.5 % of the total memory bits) and allows
for a maximum operating frequency fmax of 115 MHz (for
the slow timing model at 85 ○C) on an Altera Cyclone IV
EP4CE115 FPGA. We note that the operating frequency can
easily be increased by moving to a more powerful FPGA. Fig-
ure 10 shows the inﬂuence of the number of computing blocks
on maximum operating frequency, number of logic elements,
and the number of memory bits.
8. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we present results of experiments. In order to
illustrate our three-pronged approach, we ﬁrst discuss moni-
toring of requirements using examples of temporal logic mon-
itors as presented in Section 5. In all of the examples, actual
sensor and signal values are preﬁxed by “s ”, e.g., s baroAlt
comprises a stream of sensor readings of the barometric alti-
tude. We next discuss an example of how to determinate the
health of sensors using BNs and show results using actual
ﬂight data, where the laser altimeter failed. The ﬁnal part of
this section is devoted to an example of how our framework
can be used for reasoning about software.
8.1. Monitoring of Requirements
Recall from Section 3.2 and Figure 1 that our SHM frame-
work operates on a set of requirements, which are interpreted
via paths through a network of building blocks to achieve
our diagnostics and prognostics goals. We create model-
based monitors (Section 6) and Bayesian reasoning compo-
nents (Section 7) to support monitoring these requirements.
We create synchronous and asynchronous runtime monitors
in hardware, aboard FPGAs, from our temporal logic trans-
lations of the requirements (Section 5). In this way, require-
ments form the backbone of our SHM framework.
Here, we exemplify the monitoring process for our temporal
logic-based runtime monitors, including how they take input
from and pass input to other blocks in our SHM framework.
We demonstrate the power of generating monitors from tem-
poral logic requirements.
For example, consider the requirement ◻((s cmd ==
takeoff) → ◇[0,40s](s baroAlt ≥ 600 ft)) from Section 3.2
that states, “After takeoff, the Swift UAS must reach an alti-
tude of 600ft within 40 seconds.” Recall that we encoded this
requirement in MTL in Section 5 and discussed creating a
pair of runtime monitors that yield both a synchronous mon-
itor that updates with each tick of the system clock and an
asynchronous monitor that determines the satisfaction of the
requirement as soon as there is enough information to do so.
takeoff
s_baroAlt
s_cmd
LTL
Discrete
>= 600ft ?
s baroAlt / ft
300
600
900
s cmd
ta
ke
o
ﬀ
la
n
d
s baroAlt ≥ 600ft
s cmd = takeoﬀ
ϕF1 = ◻((s cmd = takeoﬀ) → ◇[0,40s](s baroAlt ≥ 600 ft)) ✓
Figure 11. Top panel: SHM block diagram for monitoring
requirement ◻((s cmd == takeoff) → ◇[0,40s](s baroAlt ≥
600 ft)). Middle two panels: ﬂight data collected from the
Swift UAS. Bottom three panels: output of our runtime mon-
itors for ﬂight rules.
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Figure 10. Logic synthesis results of our μBayes unit for an Altera Cyclone IV EP4CE115 FPGA: maximum operating fre-
quency fmax, number of logic elements (LE), and required memory bits versus number of parallel computing blocks
Figure 11 breaks down how we monitor this requirement.
First, the raw data from the barometric altimeter is passed
through one of our smoothing ﬁlter blocks, as described in
Section 4, to take out sensor noise that might serve to obscure
the altimeter readings. The data stream from this smoothing
ﬁlter and the raw data from the ﬂight command data stream
are the two inputs to our pair of temporal logic monitors for
this requirement. These two inputs are shown in blue in Fig-
ure 11. In the bottom three panels, in red, are the output
data streams from the asynchronous monitor. The top line is
the result of monitoring the subformula (s baroAlt ≥ 600 ft)
and the middle line is the result of monitoring the subfor-
mula (s cmd == takeoff). These two signals are combined
inside our compositional monitor construction to form the
result illustrated in the bottom panel. The panel’s straight
red line shows that the requirement holds at every time point
during the ﬂight. This bottom line is the output from our
asynchronous monitor and can be used as the input to another
block in our SHM framework, such as a Bayesian reasoning
block.
During UAS ﬂight, this output data stream will not be pro-
vided in real time, but will experience delays as there is not
enough data at every time point of ﬂight to determine that this
requirement always holds. Therefore, any blocks in our SHM
framework making real-time decisions could utilize the out-
put from the paired synchronous monitor for this formula. It
would differentiate, in real time, when we know that the ﬂight
rule holds and when we do not have enough information, at
the present time, to know.
For another example, consider the requirement
◻(◻[0,5s](v vel > 0) → ◇[0,2s]Δs baroAlt > θ)
stating that a signiﬁcant positive vertical velocity needs to be
followed by a climb in altitude. Figure 12 breaks down how
we monitor this requirement.
Again, we take the raw data from the barometric altimeter,
pass it through one of our smoothing ﬁlter blocks to reduce
the sensor noise, and feed this stream as an input to our tem-
poral monitor. (Again, the smoothed barometric altimeter
data stream appears in blue.) We also need to reason about
the vertical velocity reading; we show the raw data stream in
red. We feed this sensor data stream through a moving aver-
age ﬁlter; the result is shown in blue.
These two ﬁltered data streams are then processed by compo-
nents of our asynchronous runtime monitor; results are shown
in the bottom three panels of Figure 12. The red line at the
top, our vertical velocity monitor, checks for a “signiﬁcant
positive vertical velocity.” System designers equate this to a
steady positive reading of the ﬁltered vertical velocity reading
for ﬁve seconds. The red line in the middle, our barometric
altimeter monitor, ﬂags time points that fall within a two sec-
ond time interval when the change in altitude is above the
threshold θ. These components comprise our runtime moni-
tor, which continuously veriﬁes that “every occurrence of sig-
niﬁcant positive vertical velocity is indeed followed by a cor-
responding positive change in altitude.” This is reﬂected by
the straight red line in the bottom-most panel of Figure 12.
8.2. Sensor Health Management
The continuous monitoring of the UAS’s ﬂight-critical sen-
sors is very important. Faulty, iced, or clogged pitot tubes for
measuring speed of the aircraft has caused several catastro-
phes. For example, the crash of Birgenair Flight 301, which
claimed 189 lives, was caused by a pitot tube being blocked
by wasp nests14. Similarly, faults in the determination of the
aircraft’s altitude can lead to dangerous situations. In many
cases, however, the health of a sensor cannot be established
independently. Only by taking into account information from
other sources can a reliable result be obtained. However,
these other sources of information are also not independently
reliable, thus creating a non-trivial SHM problem.
In the following example, we use information from a baro-
metric altimeter measuring altitude above sea level, a laser
altimeter measuring altitude above ground level (AGL), and
information about the vertical velocity and the pitch angle
provided by the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). Table 4
lists the signals and their intended meanings. Our correspond-
ing SHM framework instantiation is shown in Figure 13. The
input signals are smoothed and the current vertical velocity
is estimated from the laser and barometric altimeters by cal-
culating xt − xt−1 using a single delay block. Then, the val-
14http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birgenair Flight 301
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s_V_z SmoothingFilter
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v vel (ﬁltered)/ ft
min
◻[0,5s](v vel > 0)
◇[0,2s]Δs baroAlt > θ
ϕ ∶= ◻(◻[0,5s](v vel > 0) → ◇[0,2s]Δs baroAlt > θ) ✓
Figure 12. Top panel: SHM block diagram for monitoring
a requirement. Middle three panels: Smoothed barometric
altimeter (blue) and vertical velocity readings, raw (red) and
smoothed (blue), as collected from the Swift UAS. Bottom
three panels: outputs of temporal logic monitors.
ues are discretized into increasing (inc) and decreasing (dec),
before the information is fed into the reasoning component.
Table 4. Signals and their intended meanings.
Signal name Description
s baroAlt altitude reading from barometric altimeter
s laserAlt altitude reading from laser altimeter
s velUp vertical velocity reading from IMU
s pitch Euler pitch reading from IMU
Figure 14 shows the BN model for reasoning about altime-
ter failures. Sensor nodes (inputs) for each of the different
sensor types are at the bottom. The latent state UA, describ-
ing whether the altitude of the UAS is increasing or decreas-
ing, obviously inﬂuences the sensor readings, hence there are
edges from UA to SL, SS , and SB . The laser altimeter can
fail. Therefore, the sensor node SL is connected with a node
HL, reﬂecting the health of the laser altimeter. A similar
structure can be found for the barometric altimeter. Because
the laser altimeter is prone to errors, its probability of being
healthy is only 0.7, compared to the more reliable baromet-
ric altitude with a probability of being healthy of 0.9. For
inc/dec
Smoothing
Filter inc/dec
Smoothing
Filter inc/dec
Disc
Disc
s_laserAlt
s_baroAlt
Bayesian
Network
s_velUp
s_pitch Threshold
Disc
Figure 13. SHM framework instantiation: model for altimeter
health.
simplicity, the health of the IMU is not modeled here.
S BaroAlt
(SB)
H BaroAlt
(HB)
S LaserAlt
(SL)
H LaserAlt
(HL)
S Sensors
(SS)
U Altimeter
(UA) HB ΘHB
healthy 0.9
bad 0.1
HL ΘHL
healthy 0.7
bad 0.3
UA ΘUA
inc 0.5
dec 0.5
UA SS ΘSS
inc
inc 0.7
dec 0.1
maybe 0.2
dec
inc 0.1
dec 0.7
maybe 0.2
UA HB SB ΘSB
inc
healthy inc 1.0dec 0.0
bad inc 0.5dec 0.5
dec
healthy inc 0.0dec 1.0
bad inc 0.5dec 0.5
UA HL SL ΘSL
inc
healthy inc 1.0dec 0.0
bad inc 0.5dec 0.5
dec
healthy inc 0.0dec 1.0
bad inc 0.5dec 0.5
Figure 14. Bayesian network and CPT tables for reasoning
about altimeter failure.
The CPT tables for the sensors are read as follows: if the
(latent) status UA is increasing and the laser altimeter is
healthy, then the probability that it is reading an increasing
value is 1; no decreasing measurement is reported (p = 0). In
the case of a failing laser altimeter, no result can be obtained;
hence p = 0.5. The same model is used for the barometric
altitude. The IMU sensors are modeled somewhat differently.
If they report an upward velocity, it is likely (p = 0.7) that
this has been caused by an upward movement of the UAS
(UA = inc). Due to high sensor and integration noise, the
results are not unique and UA = maybe indicates a value
within a zero-centered deadband. Figure 15 breaks down how
we evaluate this Bayesian network and how our architecture
automatically detected a temporary outage of the laser altime-
ter.
With our current implementation of the μBayes unit and a
conﬁguration as shown in Figure 13, running at a system
clock frequency of 115 MHz, the unit is able to evaluate the
Altimeter Health Model 660 times per second.
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s velUp / m
s
Pr(HL = healthy ∣ output of runtime monitors)
Pr(HB = healthy ∣ output of runtime monitors) ✓
× ×
✓ ✓
Figure 15. Flight data collected from the Swift UAS (top
three panels) and output of our Bayesian SHM model, given
as probabilities (bottom two panels).
8.3. Reasoning about Software
In principle, SHM models for software components are struc-
tured in a similar way to those for sensor monitoring. Signals
are extracted from a communications bus between compo-
nents, from speciﬁc memory locations using shared variables,
or from the operating system. No speciﬁc instrumentation
of the safety-critical control code is necessary. Compared to
hardware and sensor management, the complexity of software
health models is usually higher, because of the often sub-
stantial functionality of the code including the existence of
modes. Furthermore, substantial reasoning can be required,
because individual failures (due to dormant software bugs
or problematic hardware-software interaction) might pervade
large portions of the software system and can cause seem-
ingly unrelated failures in other components. Such a situation
occurred when a group of six F-22 Raptors was ﬁrst deployed
to the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan (Johnson, 2007).
When crossing the international dateline (180○ longitude), a
dormant software bug caused multiple computer crashes. Not
only was the navigation completely lost, but also the seem-
ingly unrelated communications computer crashed. “The
ﬁghters were able to return to Hawaii by following their
tankers in good weather. The error was ﬁxed within 48 hours
and the F-22s continued their journey to Kadena” (Johnson,
2007).
We now consider how such an unfortunate interplay between
software design and poor implementation could cause
adverse effects on the ﬂight hardware. Figure 16 shows a
mock-up of a ﬂawed architecture for a ﬂight-control com-
puter. In this architecture, all components, like GN&C, the
drivers for the aircraft sensors and actuators, as well as pay-
load components including a science camera and the trans-
mitter for the video stream, communicate via a message
queue. The message queue is fast enough to push through all
messages at the required speed. However, for debugging and
logging purposes, all message headers are written (in block-
ing mode) into an on-board ﬁle system. A corresponding
requirement appears as an example ﬂight rule in Section 5:
◻((addToQueueGN&C ∧◇removeFromQueueSwift) →
¬removeFromQueueSwift U writeToFS).
Software
Queue
System
File
GN&C
Transmitter
Antenna
Camera
Science
Message
Figure 16. Flawed system architecture for ﬁle system-related
scenario.
This architecture works perfectly when the system is started
and the ﬁle system is empty or near empty. However, after
some time of operation, as the ﬁle system becomes increas-
ingly populated (but writes can still occur), sudden aircraft
oscillations, similar to pilot-induced-oscillations (PIO), take
place. No software error whatsoever (e.g., overfull ﬁle sys-
tem or overfull message queue) is reported and the situation
worsens if the science camera, which also uses this message
queue, is in operation.
The underlying root cause is that writes into the ﬁle system
take an increasing amount of time as the ﬁle system ﬁlls up
(due to long searches for free blocks). This situation accounts
for longer delays in the message queue, which cause delays
in the seemingly unrelated control loop, ultimately causing
oscillations of the entire UAS. For a software health model,
therefore, non-trivial reasoning is important, because such
failures can manifest themselves in seemingly unrelated com-
ponents of the aircraft.
Table 5 and Figure 17 show details of our model. All signals
except the barometric altitude are extracted from the operat-
ing system running on the ﬂight computer. In the diagram in
Figure 17, discrete signals are fed directly into the Bayesian
networks; continuous signals like the length of the message
queue or the amount of data in the ﬁle system are catego-
rized to enable discretization into threshold blocks, e.g., the
ﬁle system is empty, ﬁlled to more than 50%, ﬁlled to more
than 90%, or full. The barometric altitude is fed through a
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) in order to obtain the frequency
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Table 5. Signals and their intended meanings.
Signal name Description
s FS Error error in ﬁle system
s W FS writing into ﬁle system
s FS “df” of ﬁle system
s Queue lng length of message queue
s baroAlt barometric altitude
s delta q dynamic queue behavior (derived)
s osc UAS oscillation (derived)
> 50%
s_FS_Error
s_baroAlt
s_FS
s_Queue_lng
s_W_FS
Threshold
Threshold
Discrete
FFT
Network
Bayesian
empty
> 90%
Figure 17. Structure of the SHM model for the ﬁle system
scenario.
spectrum. Again, a threshold block is used to determine if
amplitudes are above a certain threshold indicating oscilla-
tion (low frequency) or strong vibrations (higher frequency).
Figure 18 shows the relevant excerpt from our Bayesian SHM
model for this scenario, including the ﬁle system and the
message queue. The software-related sensor nodes for this
model are located on the left-hand side of the network: a
sensor to detect writes to the ﬁle system and a sensor pro-
viding information on storage capacity in the ﬁle system
(with states: empty, medium, almost- full, and full). Simi-
larly, S Queue length provides information about the length
of the message queue. Finally, S Delta queue senses whether
the length of the message queue is increasing or decreasing.
Nodes for the internal status of components, such as the ﬁle
system and the message queue, are connected via sensor and
health nodes. The behavior nodes for system oscillation and
delay build the foundation for reasoning about this and simi-
lar scenarios.
Figure 19 shows the temporal traces of a ﬁle system-induced
fault scenario (Schumann, Morris, Mbaya, Mengshoel, &
Darwiche, 2011) in simulation. The ﬂight controller’s pitch-
up and pitch-down commands to the actuators (top panel) are
impacted by faults originating from the ﬁle system, causing
the aircraft to oscillate up and down rather than maintaining
the desired altitude. For the purpose of this experiment, we
set the ﬁle system to almost full at the start of the simulation
run; no other faults or errors occur. After about 30 seconds,
Error
Delta_queue
Oscillation
File_System
Queue_length
File_System
File_System
Msg_queue
Delay
Oscillation
Msg_queue
Rest of Bayesian SWHM
Network
S_
S_
S_
S_
U_ H_
H_
U_
File_System_
File_System
Write_
S_
Figure 18. Relevant nodes from Bayesian system health
model for oscillation detection.
the delays caused by the message queue have accumulated in
such a way that ﬂight-control induced oscillations of the air-
craft occur, indicated by recurrent climbs and descends (mid-
dle panel). Eventually, these altitude oscillations are detected
and picked up by the Fast Fourier Transform, and a signal is
sent to S Oscillation. The bottom panel of Figure 19 shows
the posteriors for selected health nodes. It indicates that the
actual aircraft sensors and actuators are healthy. However, the
health status of the software (blue) decreases substantially a
little after 100 seconds, indicating a problem in the on-board
software. In this scenario, the health of the ﬁle system and
of the message queue, when considered individually, do not
drop signiﬁcantly. Also, the software itself does not ﬂag any
error.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a three-pronged approach to sensor and soft-
ware health management in real time, on-board a UAS.
Health models are constructed in a modular and scalable man-
ner using a number of different building blocks. Major block
types provide advanced capabilities of temporal logic runtime
monitors, model-based analysis and signal processing, and
powerful probabilistic reasoning using Bayesian networks.
For our overarching design requirements of unobtrusiveness,
responsiveness, and realizability, we automatically transform
the health model into efﬁcient FPGA hardware designs. We
demonstrated the capabilities of this approach on a set of
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Figure 19. Traces of simulation experiment with ﬁle-system
related failure scenario. Top panel: actuator messages sent
through the message queue. Middle panel: vertical speed and
altitude of the aircraft showing oscillations. Bottom panel:
posterior probabilities of selected health nodes.
requirements and ﬂight rules, both for sensor and software
health management. We presented experimental results for
this approach using actual data from the NASA Swift UAS.
Our approach enables the designer to build complex
models and reasoning modes. For example, tempo-
ral reasoning over the results of probabilistic health out-
puts can be formulated easily: (alt < 1000ft) →
◇[0,10s](P (H laserAlt = healthy) > 0.8) would require a
working laser altimeter at altitudes of less than 1000ft. In
a similar manner, results of prognostics components can be
smoothly integrated into our framework.
However, the results shown here are only the ﬁrst steps
towards a real-time on-board sensor and software health man-
agement system. For the proof of concept demonstration in
this paper, we analyzed recorded data streams from the Swift
UAS on the ground as if they were happening in real time.
There are two clear options for reading this data on-board the
Swift UAS instead: reading sensor data passed on the com-
mon bus or having sensor data sent to our framework by the
ﬂight computer. In the near future, we plan to deﬁne and
build unobtrusive read-only interfaces that will enable us to
get real-time sensor and software data from the common bus
or ﬂight computer while providing the guarantee that under
no circumstances would our framework disturb the bus or any
other UAS component. This is a major requirement for certi-
ﬁcation and carrying out actual ﬂight tests on the Swift UAS.
On a broader level, research needs to be performed on how to
automatically generate advanced system health management
models from requirements, designs, and architectural arti-
facts. In particular for monitoring the health of a complex and
large software system, automatic model generation is essen-
tial. We are conﬁdent that our approach, which allows us
to combine monitoring of sensors, prognostics, and software
while separating out (model-based) signal processing, tem-
poral, and probabilistic reasoning will substantially facilitate
the development of improved and powerful on-board health
management systems for unmanned aerial systems.
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